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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
SECURITY INTERESTS IN KEOGH
PLANS

Many prudent people_ prepare
for their retirement by contributing to a fund while they are still
working. Among the popular
types of retirement plans is the
Keogh plan, ..also called an HR-1 0
plan. The Keogh plan allows a
self-employed person to save and
invest for retirement while enjoying certain tax benefits, including
the sheltering of the income used
to make contributions to the pliiln.
However, ·the plan must meet certain requirements to enjoy these
tax attributes. For example, the
amounts contributed are limited,
and premature withdrawals are
subject to a 10 percent pen(!lty.
Each Keogh plan also provides
that tQ.e beneficiary's interest in
the fund may.not be assigned or
alienated.

Many courts have focused on
the fate of a Keogh plan when the
self-employe~ beneficiary files ·a
chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.
The prevailing view is that Keogh
plans are self-settled trusfs that
are included in the bankruptcy estate.1 The plan is exempt only to
the extent that it may be exempt
under the applicable exemption
statutes. A different issue arises,
however, when the beneficiary
attempts to give a creditor a security interest in the Keogh plan
prior to bankruptcy. Is a-security
interest in a Keogh plan effective?
In re Nix

The answer to this question is
found in the opinion of the C<>urt
of Appeals for the Fifth Citcuit in
In re Nix. 2 On September 17,
1982, Dr. John Nix borrowed
$50,000 from the First National
Bank and executed an agreement
to secure the debt with certain
"Keogh Self-Security Account."
The funds invested in the· Keogh
plan had been used to purchase

a

* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; Counsel to the law firm of
Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Peddy &
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1
See, e.g., In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th
Cir. 1983); see also Weintraub & ResnicK,
"From the Bankruptcy Courts: In re
Goff-Keogh Plans and IRAs as Property
of the Bankruptcy Estate," 16 U.C.C.L.J.
264 {1984).
2
864 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1989).
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stock in an oil company; the
custodian of the account was
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc-., stockbrokers.
Apparently, First National
Bank had initially questioned its
abllity to create an enforceable security ~nterest in a Keogh plan.
The bank relied on an opinion letter from Dr. Nix's lawyer, which
concluded that a lien on the
Keogh account could be created
under Texas law pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 3 First National informed
Merrill Lynch of the security interest- and also filed with the
Secretary of State a financing
statement describing the Keogh
account as the collateral.
Later, two new promissory
notes were issued to First National in the sum of $80,000 and
$25,000, ·and the original $50,000
promissory note was released.
Nix secured both of the new notes
by again granting First National a
security interest in the Keogh account. As th~ court commented,
"There can be no doubt, therefore; that both Nix and the Bank
intended the assets in the account
to serve as collateral -for loans
from the bank to Nix. " 4 Subsequently, the balance of the
Keogh fund was reduced to
3
Section numbers of the Texas version
of ·the Uniform Commercial Code vary
from the section numbers of the official
version of the UCC. For the convenience
of the readers, references to Code sections
in this article are to the official version.
4
864 F.2d at·l210.
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$30,797 when Nix withdrew some
of the assets from the account.
After Nix defaulted on both
notes, he and his wife filed a chapter 7 petition. At that time the
amount owed to First National
was $124,724.88, including principal and interest. First National
asserted that it had a perfected security interest in the Keogh account and requested that the automatic stay be lifted so that it could
foreclose. The trustee in bankruptcy, joined by Nix, opposed
First National's request "on the
grounds that the· Keogh account is
a bank account rather than an intangible asset, and that the transactions between the bank and Nix
did not suffice to create a valid,
perfected lien. " 5
The court of appeals succinctly
summarized the issue: "The issue
is whether a Keogh retirement
plan, created to comply with
federal tax law, is an intangible
upon which a security li~n may be
created pursuant to Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. " 6
Before tackling the issue on the
merits, the court of appeals was
quick to note that the case
reached that court by an ''unusual
route." The issue was argued before a magistrate and not the
bankruptcy court, since the district court had withdrawn from
this case and others pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and then referred the case to a magistrate.
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FROM THE BANKRUPTCY-COURTS

Althougb it approved the refer- 106 as, .any personal property (inence "because of a compelling cluding things in action) other
need" to expedite bankruptcy than goods, accounts, chattel pacases, the court stated that a ref- per, documents. instruments, and
erence to a magistrate of a bank- money. " 10
Referring to the Official Comruptcy case should only be
effectuated for an expediency of ment to Section 9-106, the CQllrt
this nature. 7
enunciated miscellaneous types of
Turning now to the merits of contractual rights that are custhe proceeding, the court of ap- _tomarily used as commercial sepeals had no doubt that funds irr a curity, such as goodwill, literary
debtor's Keogh account are prop- rights, and rights of performance.
erty of the bankruptcy estate and The Official Comment also refers
ordinarily pass to the trustee even to Section 9-106 as a," catch-all"
if the trust document creating the definition. Based on the broad
Keogh plan contains language scope of the definition of "general
prohibiting assignment or alien- intangibles," the court of appeals
ation. 8 A clause providing restric- held that it "by its literal terms
tions on alienation is void as encompasses the right of the_ peragainst the beneficiary's credi- son who ·establishes a Keogh plan
tors. "The issue, therefore, is to withdraw funds from the trust
solely whether the assets in Nix's or account established to impleKeogh plan are subject to the lien ment the plan. " 11
asserted by the bank. " 9
The magistrate, on the oth~r
hand, thought that the Keogh acRights in Keogh Plans as General count was not subject to an Article 9 security interest because
Intangibles
Section 9-104(1) exch.ides from
The court focused on Section 9Article 9, the ''transfer of an inter201 of the Code and pointed out
est in any deposif account." The
that the section makes security
court of appeals disagreed, with
agreements effective according to
the magistrate's characterization
their terms if they comply with
of the Keogh account as a
the provisions of Article 9. As to
"deposit account" and based its
general intangibles that "may be
analysis on Section 9-105, which
subject to security agreements,
defines a deposit account as "a
[they] are defined broadly in § 9demand, time, savings, passbook
or like account maintained with a
7
Id. at 1211.
• The court cited its decision in In r~ bank, savings and loan associaWitlin, 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981), where
the court held that a self-settled Keogh
plan passes to the trustee in bankruptcy.
9
864 F .2d at 1211.
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tion, credit union or like organization, other than an account
evidenced by a certificate of deposit. " 12
The court of appeals refused to
recognize a Keogh account as
simply a savings account for selfemployed persons in anticipation
ot retirement. The distinction between Keogh plans and deposit
accounts was explained by the
court:
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"deposif-account" under Section
9-105 and that it is a "general intangible" that m~y be the subject
of an Article 9 security interest.
The court reversed the magistrate's holding that no ·valid lien
could be placed on Nix's Keogh
account, ·but since the magistrate
concluded that First National had
not properly perfected its lien and
his conclusion ''depended crucially on the premise that a valid lien
on a Keogh account could not be
created, " 14 the case was remanded for further proceedings.

As the separate treatment of certificates of deposit in [Section 9:105 of
the UCC] suggests, the phrase
~·savings account ... maintained
with a bank . . . or like organizaConclusion
tion'.' refers to accounts from
Although the bank took the iniwhich the qepositor may withdraw
funds at any tim~. subject only to tiative in seeking relief from the
such notice agreements as the bank automatic stay to foreclose on its
may require. In <:ontrast, a Keogh lien in the Keogh account, neverplan must be established in accord- theless, absent such initiative
allCe with- the provisions of the Merrill Lynch as custodian would
Internal Revenue Service, and is
have been obligated to "deliver to
;ubject to the penalty tax' that discourages regular withdrawhls: the trustee any property of the
Whereas bank accounts are funded debtor held by or. transferred to
15
sole1y with cash, a Keogh plan may such custodian." Of course, in
be, a~ Nix's, \vas, funded in whole that event, the custodian most
or in part with stock. Moreover, likely would interplead the bank,
Merrjll Lynch is nq_t "a b~k" or the trustee, and the debtor in
"like organization," but a stock- order to relieve itself from any rebrqker. It therefore could not ac- sponsibility. The result, however, ·
cept deposit§ under Texas Law. It ·would not change the·outcome.
held Nix's Keogh plan assets as a
Although the court of appeals
- fiduciary for him, not simply as a
noted
the fact tliat the custodian
bank receiving a deposit. 13

The court concluded, therefore,
"that a Keogh plan is not a
12

13

of the Keogh account in Nix was a
stockbroker and not a bank, it
appears that the court's decision
14

U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(e).
864 F.2d at 1212.

15
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FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

would have been the same if the certain states !}ave created exfunds contributed to the Keogh emptions Tor Keogh plans so as
plan had been deposited with a to put such.retiremenl savings out
bank. In such situations the bank of the reach of creditors. f 7 Noneis acting as a trustee and fiduciary theless, self-employed- persons..
subject to restrictions, and there should learn the lesson of Nix:
still would be tax penalti'es on ear- Debtors m'ay be effe~tively ·waivly withdrawal. In essence, the ing exemption protection wheh
bank holding a Keogh account is they voluntarily give a lendet a seacting in a capacity that is ''not curity interest in a Keogh acsimply as a bank receiving a de- count.
posit. '' 16
17
For example, New York exemption
Some debtors may take comfort
protect Keogh plans. See N.Y. Civ.
in the fact that Section 522(b) of laws
Prac. L. &. R. § 5205(c)(-2) (McKinney
the Bankruptcy Code protects 1989). Most states have opted out of the
property that is exempt and that federal exemption alternative provided)n
16

864 F.2d at 1212.

§§ 522(b)(l) and 522(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code, and in such states, exemptions11re
determined by state 1aw.
•
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